Strengthen Congress with the Upcoming Debt Limit Deal

The U.S. is projected to reach the debt limit as soon as February 2027, with the X-date falling between August and November 2027, according to Bank of America analysts. Some members have called for a lame-duck reconciliation bill to raise the limit this year, but a bipartisan deal next year looks more likely.

History suggests an opportunity: debt limit deals have often included more than a higher borrowing cap. Budget targets and enforcement, commissions, constitutional amendment votes, and process changes have accompanied savings. But these deals usually come together quickly behind closed doors and amid intense partisan positioning. The rushed drafting shows.

Better-designed variations on established themes are available. They can help Congress control deficits and debt, rebalance the separation of powers, and let all members legislate.

Targets and Enforcement

First Generation

  • Deficit and Discretionary Limits: Congress has tried targets and enforcement before in debt limit deals, but each design had flaws. The 1985 deficit caps fell in Bowsher v. Synar because a legislative official ran the sequester. The 1987 fix moved that job to the White House Office of Management and Budget but kept the same approach to targets that are too volatile for Congress to meet. The 1990 act shifted to discretionary caps and pay-as-you-go rules for direct spending and revenue, which held decently well until they lapsed after the late-1990s surpluses. Debt limit deals in 2010, 2011, and 2023 revived them. Congress has approved targets and enforcement, but design quality determines whether they are politically sustainable.

Next Generation

  • Structural Balance: The Responsible Budget Targets Act can supply practical mechanics for a bipartisan goal like a 3 percent deficit-to-GDP target. It supports stable policymaking in the near term while bringing trends of revenue and primary (non-interest) spending together over the medium term. It proposes a glide path to primary structural balance with adjustments for automatic stabilizers, revenue changes, and emergency spending. Notably, Congress could approve spending for a crisis without immediate pay-fors, and the targets would adjust to offset it over the following six fiscal years.
  • Automatic Enforcement: More sophisticated backstops are possible. A proof-of-concept for automatic incremental enforcement would have OMB adjust pre-set statutory parameters, split between spending and revenue, when targets are missed. Because savings would come from more places and over a longer period than under the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Statutory PAYGO), the burden would spread more widely and less acutely, reducing pressure to turn enforcement off.
  • Social Security Solvency: Relatedly, automatic fiscal stabilizers for Social Security can reduce the program’s funding gap and encourage Congress to consider other updates. It may also be reasonable, or at least politically desirable, to separate Social Security from the Responsible Budget Targets Act structure if Congress can actively manage it separately.
  • Conditional Debt Limit Relief: Staying within the targets could suspend the debt limit through October 1 each year. Treasury could then use extraordinary measures briefly while evaluating the just-completed fiscal year. If the budget met targets again, the debt limit suspension would extend another year. If the budget missed targets, Congress would still have several months to raise or suspend the debt limit like it does now. That vote could require savings tied to how far the budget missed its target.
Learn from Past Commissions to Build for the Future

First Generation: After a Senate amendment to add a fiscal commission to Statutory PAYGO failed in 2010, President Obama promised to establish one through executive order. He established the Simpson-Bowles Commission days after signing the Act. The Budget Control Act of 2011 set up a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, also known as the “Super Committee.” Neither produced enacted deficit reduction.

Next Generation: A new commission could incorporate additional options like engaging the public, having a statutory basis, and ensuring broad support without an overwhelming supermajority. The everything-on-the-table Fiscal Commission Act or the Sustainable Budget Act or the Social-Security-and-Medicare-focused Time to Rescue United States (TRUST) Act could strengthen relationships in Congress, modernize programs, and improve the budget process and outlook.

Incentives for Productive Bargaining

First Generation

  • No Budget, No Pay: The No Budget No Pay Act of 2013, a short-term debt limit deal, threatened to withhold pay for members of Congress until each house passed a budget resolution. Both passed a resolution, so the penalty did not apply, but the houses did not harmonize them because that wasn’t required.

Next Generation

  • Real Budget: A real budget as laid out in the Comprehensive Congressional Budget Act would let all members look at all spending and revenue policies through a bottom-up process. Members could seek savings, coordinate and manage programs, strengthen congressional cohesion, and rebalance interbranch powers.
  • Prevent Shutdowns: Once a new fiscal year starts, the Prevent Government Shutdowns Act would keep Congress in session until appropriations finish with no program interruptions in the meantime.
  • President’s Budget Request before State of the Union: Congress can withhold the invitation for the president to give the State of the Union address until it gets the president’s budget request and national security strategy through the Send Us Budget Materials and International Tactics In Time (SUBMIT IT) Act.
Constitutional Commitment

First Generation, Annual Balance: The Budget Control Act of 2011 required each house to vote on proposals for a balanced budget amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The House vote on a BBA failed to clear the required two-thirds threshold for constitutional amendments with only 61.3 percent support, and the Senate’s 67 affirmative votes were split between two versions. All three had shortcomings, especially by proposing to limit each year’s outlays to that year’s volatile revenue.

Next Generation, Multiyear Targets: Newer approaches to a constitutional fiscal rule may attract greater support, including the Principles-based BBA, the Business Cycle BBA, and a debt limit amendment. These proposals would support more stable and predictable policy by letting spending and revenue balance over the economic cycle.

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A debt limit deal is one of the few moments when members consider the budget holistically. That makes 2027 a rare chance to pair a debt limit increase with reforms that strengthen Congress’s power of the purse by giving every member real chances to pursue priorities in the federal budget.