Operation Epic Fury demonstrated that the U.S. military retains extraordinary operational capabilities relative to its global counterparts. But those successes came at a cost. The U.S. burned through scarce, high-demand munitions faster than they can be replenished, leaving the force less prepared for higher-priority threats in other theaters.
Munitions Depletion and Replenishment Timelines
Defending U.S. forces, regional assets, and Gulf partners consumed significant quantities of long-range strike munitions and scarce air and missile defense interceptors. The readiness shows up in replacement timelines, which run from months for some systems to roughly five years for others.
| Munition | Estimated Prewar Inventory | Estimated Use in Iran War | Estimated Use as Share of Prewar Inventory | Estimated Full Replenishment Timeline |
| Tomahawk | 3,100 | 1,000+ | 32%+ | Late 2030–early 2031; roughly 4.5–5 years |
| JASSM | 4,400 | 1,100+ | 25%+ | Mid-2027; roughly 1 year |
| PrSM | 90 | 40–70 | 44%–78% | Late 2026; roughly 6 months |
| SM-3 | 410 | 130–250 | 32%–61% | Early 2029; roughly 2.5 years |
| SM-6 | 1,160 | 190–370 | 16%–32% | Late 2028–early 2029; roughly 2.5 years |
| THAAD | 360 | 190–290 | 53%–81% | Mid- to late 2029; roughly 3–3.5 years |
| Patriot | 2,330 | 1,060–1,430 | 45%–61% | Mid-2029; roughly 3 years |
| Source: CSIS, FY 2027 Budget Materials | ||||
Tomahawk missiles highlight the challenge: we can expend critical munitions in days, but it takes years to rebuild inventories. So far, the U.S. consumed over 1,000 Tomahawks in the conflict with Iran—more than a decade’s worth of procurement at the average rate of 86 missiles per year. Even with higher procurement, replacement missiles are not expected to reach U.S. inventories until 2030, and growing demand from allies is further straining supply.
Damage to Equipment, Bases, and Regional Infrastructure
The campaign also took a toll on hard-to-replace equipment. U.S. air losses alone totaled 42 aircraft and systems:
| Aircraft/System | Role | Reported Lost or Damaged |
| MQ-9 Reaper | Uncrewed ISR/strike aircraft | 24 |
| KC-135 Stratotanker | Aerial refueling tanker | 7 |
| F-15E Strike Eagle | Fighter/strike aircraft | 4 |
| MC-130J Commando II | Special operations airlift/tanker | 2 |
| F-35A Lightning II | Fifth-generation fighter | 1 |
| A-10 Thunderbolt II | Close air support aircraft | 1 |
| E-3 Sentry/AWACS | Airborne command and control | 1 |
| HH-60W Jolly Green II | Combat rescue helicopter | 1 |
| MQ-4C Triton | High-altitude maritime ISR aircraft | 1 |
| Total | 42 | |
| Source: Congressional Research Service | ||
The losses are not interchangeable. KC-135 tankers underwrite aerial refueling and long-range power projection; F-15E Strike Eagles are high-end strike aircraft that cannot be replaced quickly or cheaply. The E-3 Sentry is an aging, low-density command-and control platform, and losing even one strains an already thin fleet
Regional bases and infrastructure:
The Pentagon has not released an official damage estimate, but a Washington Post satellite-imagery analysis identified at least 228 damaged or destroyed structures and pieces of equipment at U.S. facilities in the region. Iranian strikes also rendered inoperable the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar, the installation from which the United States has directed Middle East air campaigns for decades, though it was not in use at the time. At least one THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar was destroyed, a ballistic-missile-defense system that takes years to replace. Additional imagery showed hits on buildings and radar infrastructure housing THAAD components.
Fiscal Costs
Pentagon officials have put the direct cost of operations at $29 billion, with $24 billion of it tied to repairing damaged equipment and replacing key munitions. That figure excludes the full cost of rebuilding damaged installations in the region, and it will climb as more expenses surface.
The final price tag may run far higher. Some independent estimates put total costs north of $100 billion once broader operational expenses and longer-term support requirements are counted. As of June 23, 2026, the administration has not sent a formal supplemental request, but public reporting suggests it may ask for a future war-related package of $80 to $100 billion to replenish munitions and address readiness gaps.
The Cost to the Force
The United States can absorb the costs of the Iran War, but the key question is whether those costs were justified.
Absorbing costs is not the same as incurring them wisely. Operation Epic Fury depleted scarce munitions, damaged high-value assets, created a long-term replenishment burden, and diverted resources from higher priority needs.
Matthew MacKenzie is a Foreign Policy Analyst at Americans for Prosperity.
