Before you support it,
read the file.

Compiled Historical Record - Public Archive

Every case below is a country that tried state-run socialism. Each kept records: famine ledgers, refugee counts, wall deaths, ration cards. This page doesn't editorialize. It just opens the file.

 Case File 07 

Venezuela

Join the fight!

Socialism and communism won't stop coming for our way of life... so we can't stop either. Sign up for updates, new evidence, and ways to push back.

FILE STATUS: DECLASSIFIED.

SUBJECT: STATE SOCIALISM, 1917–PRESENT.

CASES ON RECORD: 7.

1999-Present

Venezuela holds the world's largest proven oil reserves. Under "21st-century socialism," the government nationalized oil, agriculture and other industries and imposed strict price and currency controls.

State-run oil producer PDVSA — the country's main source of hard currency — saw output collapse for years afterward, as experienced staff were replaced for political loyalty and reinvestment lagged.

3.5M→ ~0.7M

~75%

Price controls meant to keep goods affordable instead made them unprofitable to sell — emptying shelves through the mid-2010s.

This is the most current file in the archive. Not a 20th-century relic, but an economy still unwinding price controls, expropriations, and currency collapse in real time.

BPD, PDVSA oil production, late 1990s peak to recent lows

Cumulative GDP contraction, roughly 2013–2021 (IMF/World Bank estimates)

Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook; OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (PDVSA production data); World Bank national accounts data.

 Case File 05 

CUBA

1959-Present

Cuba nationalized industry and agriculture after 1959. It has maintained a state-run rationed food system (the libreta) continuously since 1962 — now the longest-running food rationing program in the world outside wartime.

The economy's deeper fragility showed when Soviet subsidies vanished. In the "Special Period" of the early 1990s, Cuba's GDP contracted an estimated 35% in just a few years — exposing how dependent the planned economy had become on outside support rather than its own productivity.

~35%

+62 Yrs

~75%

A 2021 currency reform meant to unify Cuba's dual-currency system triggered a fresh round of steep inflation. Average state salaries remain far below regional peers even after adjustment.

Cuba's government attributes much of its scarcity to the decades-long U.S. trade embargo — a real and material factor economists weigh alongside the effects of central planning. Both are part of the honest record here.

GDP contraction during the "Special Period," early 1990s, after Soviet subsidies ended

Decline in Cuban sugar production, once the country's flagship export, from the late 1980s to the 2010s

Continuous food rationing (since 1962)

Sources: Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información (ONEI, Cuban state statistics office); UN Human Development reports; USDA Foreign Agricultural Service sugar production data.

 Case File 04 

East Germany

1949-1990

A planned economy under one-party rule, the GDR is one of the clearest side-by-side comparisons in this file: one nation, one culture, split into a market economy and a planned one for four decades.

By the late 1980s, the GDR's own internal economic assessment (the confidential Schürer Report, prepared for the Politburo in October 1989) concluded the country was effectively insolvent under the weight of its hard-currency debt. That's a government secretly admitting its own economic model had failed — a month before the Wall fell.

~30%

~2x

10-13 Yrs

The government built the Berlin Wall in 1961 explicitly to stop citizens from leaving for the West — a rare case of a government stating outright that its wall's purpose was to keep people in, not out. A small number of those crossing attempts ended in documented deaths.

But the more telling number may be the bill for fixing what was left. Reunification is estimated to have cost West Germany well over a trillion euros in transfers and investment to modernize East German infrastructure and industry — a cost still being paid down decades later.

East German labor productivity relative to West Germany by 1989 (est.)

Average wait time to buy a Trabant, the GDR's standard consumer car

West German per-capita GDP vs. East German, at 1990 reunification

Sources: German Federal Archives, Schürer Report (Oct. 1989); German Federal Statistical Office reunification-era comparisons; Center for Contemporary History (ZZF) Potsdam.

 Case File 03 

Cambodia

1975-1979

The Khmer Rouge ran the most extreme version of this experiment on record. Money was abolished outright. The national bank building in Phnom Penh was dynamited. Private property, wages, and markets were eliminated entirely.

The population was moved to agricultural labor communes and paid in nothing. Output was collected and redistributed — or exported — by the state alone.

Rice quotas for export were maintained even as the communes producing that rice were themselves starving. It's the same targets-over-reality failure seen in the USSR and China, taken to its logical end.

Death here isn't a side effect worth footnoting — it's the direct, documented result of a forced-labor economy with no market, no wage, and no way to opt out.

$0

~21%

1.5-2M

Cambodia spent years afterward rebuilding the most basic institutions of a functioning economy — a currency, banks, property records — from nothing.

National currency in circulation, 1975–79 — money was formally abolished

Deaths from execution, forced labor and starvation under the labor-commune system

Of Cambodia's population, in under 4 years

Source: Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam); Yale University Cambodian Genocide Program.

 Case File 02 

CHINA

1958–1976

The Great Leap Forward (1958–62) pushed peasants off farm work and into makeshift "backyard furnaces." They melted down usable tools and household metal into low-grade pig iron — mostly unusable.

Local officials, under pressure to hit quotas, over-reported harvests. So the central government kept requisitioning grain based on numbers that didn't match reality. Real agricultural output collapsed.

The result was the deadliest famine of the century — the same plan-versus-reality gap seen in the Soviet case above.

~28%

3x+

10 Yrs

The Cultural Revolution that followed wasn't primarily an economic policy. But it functioned like one — factories were run by political committees instead of technical managers, and industrial production stagnated for a decade.

The clearest evidence of the cost is the contrast with what came next. China's growth rate jumped dramatically once Deng Xiaoping's reforms brought back markets and private incentive, starting in 1978.

Fall in national grain output, 1958 to 1960 (from ~200M to ~143.5M tonnes)

Universities and schools closed or disrupted during the Cultural Revolution, 1966–76

Acceleration in GDP growth after 1978, once market-based reforms replaced central planning

Sources: F. Dikötter, "Mao's Great Famine" (2010, based on provincial party archives); World Bank & IMF historical GDP series, pre/post-1978; Judith Banister, demographic reconstructions.

Case File 01

USSR

1922-1991

Soviet central planning replaced market prices with five-year plans and fixed quotas.

Forced collectivization in the early 1930s stripped farmers of any stake in their own output. Many slaughtered livestock rather than hand it to collective farms.

Grain harvests fell sharply, but state quotas stayed fixed. That gap between targets and reality shows up in almost every case file here. In Ukraine and the North Caucasus, it produced a famine (the Holodomor) that killed millions. That's why it's mentioned here, despite this file's focus on economics over deaths.

~0%

~22%

~45%

By the 1980s, shortages were routine. Soviet economists estimated citizens spent a significant chunk of each week just standing in line.

When price controls finally lifted in the early 1990s, decades of suppressed shortages surfaced all at once — inflation topped 2,500% in a single year.

Soviet GDP growth by the early 1980s, down from ~5%/yr in the 1950s–60s — the "Era of Stagnation"

Decline in Soviet livestock herds, 1928–33, as farmers slaughtered animals rather than collectivize them

Drop in grain harvests, 1928–33, even as export & requisition quotas held steady

Sources: R.W. Davies & S. Wheatcroft, "The Years of Hunger" (agricultural output data); CIA historical assessments of Soviet GDP growth; State Archive Service of Ukraine; R. Conquest, "The Harvest of Sorrow."

 Case File 06 

North Korea

1948-Present

North and South Korea started from the same peninsula, the same people, and roughly the same postwar devastation in 1953.

Since then, one side built a market economy. The other built a fully state-controlled command economy under the Juche system. It's one of the closest things to a controlled experiment in economic systems that history offers.

The results are visible from space: satellite imagery consistently shows South Korea lit up at night and North Korea almost entirely dark.

~$34,000

~$1,700

The clearest human cost of that gap came in 1994–98, in a famine known as the "Arduous March." It followed decades of centrally planned agriculture and the loss of Soviet subsidies after the USSR's collapse.

Estimates of the death toll range from the hundreds of thousands into the millions — a direct consequence of the systemic collapse, not a separate event.

Estimated North Korean GDP per capita (Bank of Korea est.)

South Korean GDP per capita — roughly 20x North Korea's, from the same 1953 starting point

Sources: Bank of Korea national income estimates for North Korea; World Bank South Korea GDP data; NASA/NOAA nighttime satellite imagery; Goodkind & West, "The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact" (Population and Development Review).

Peak annual inflation rate, 2018 (IMF estimate)

1,000,000%+

14 zeros

Cut from the currency across three redenominations (2008, 2018, 2021) just to keep prices usable

USSR

CUBA

CHINA

CAMBODIA

E. GERMANY

N. KOREA

VENEZUELA

The Calculation Problem

Prices in a market economy carry information — how scarce something is, how much people want it. When a state sets prices and quotas by central plan instead, that information gets lost.

Planners end up guessing, and the guesses compound: too much steel, not enough grain. Warehouses full of one good, empty shelves for another.

The Incentive Problem

When the state owns the farm, the factory, and the outcome, individual effort and output get disconnected.

Collectivized farms across the USSR, China, and Cambodia all saw the same pattern: yields dropped sharply compared to the same land under private or semi-private management.

Why This Keeps Happening

Not bad luck. Not just bad leaders. Two structural problems show up in nearly every case file above.

A Fair Distinction: "But Sweden isn't like this"

This is a legitimate point worth engaging honestly, not dodging. Sweden, Denmark, and Norway are market economies with private property and competitive businesses. They layer a large welfare state — healthcare, education, benefits — on top of capitalism.

That's meaningfully different from the countries in this archive, which nationalized the means of production itself: state ownership of farms, factories, and firms, run by central plan rather than markets.

Every case file above is that second kind — state-controlled production, not a welfare state layered on markets. The outcomes documented here are specific to that model, and that's the model this archive is about.

FILE STATUS: DECLASSIFIED.     SUBJECT: STATE SOCIALISM, 1917–PRESENT.     CASES ON RECORD: 7.

Join the fight!